"Show Me Your Tits!": A Contract Law Analysis
Professor Seymore Butz, J. Walker School of Law
Professor Oliver Cleauzoff, Ron Jeremy University Law School
69 J. L. & Alc. 1234 (Mardi Gras Symposium Issue)
... It is therefore clear that this transaction is a unilateral contract. We have an offer (e.g. "Show me your tits, woooooo!!!") supported by consideration (beads), and an acceptance that is manifested by performance (that is, baring of the breasts). The question, of course, is whether this transaction falls within the scope of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. We believe that it does.
Article 2 applies to transactions in goods, with "goods" defined as "all things...which are movable at the time of identification to the contract other than the money in which the price is to be paid...." UCC §§ 2-102, 2-105. Clearly, plastic beads are movable at the time of the contract, but what of boobs? Other than those surgically enhanced yabos, the average bosom will heave up and down, left and right, jiggling and bouncing - oh so delightfully movable. However, regardless of whether sweet sweater-kittens fall within the Article 2 definition of "goods," as flashing is the valuable consideration in exchange for particular beads, they are part and parcel of an Article 2 transaction.
...
Consider the following scenario: A offers a string of expensive "marijuana-leaf" beads to B in exchange for a flash. B accepts and places the beads around her neck, but refuses to perform. What remedies might A pursue?
A has several options. First, he could seek restitution of his beads. This, however, would not be ideal. Although uncommon enough to warrant certain the sight of mammaries, even marijuana-leaf beads fluctuate in value according to time and place. If the lawsuit takes place after Mardi Gras (alternatively, Spring Break), it is highly unlikely that A will be able to exchange his beads for a glimpse of milk globes. Hence, although he will be put back where he was before he had entered into the contract, even the judge cannot order restitution of time. A will have to wait until the next Mardi Gras before his beads regain their value.
However, the same reasons that make restitution unattractive also make specific performance a real possibility. Specific performance is a viable remedy "where the goods are unique or in other proper circumstances." UCC § 2-716(1). This is a case of "other proper circumstances" because, given the gap between breach and suit, A will be unable to "cover" by convincing another drunk girl to drop her shirt for those beads, and may have no other beads special enough to see a quality pair of tatas. Hence, specific performance is the proper alternative, and B must display her melons in all their glory.
One final issue arises, insofar as whether B may be liable for consequential damages. For example, let us say that A can prove that, had B simply rejected his offer, A would have been able to trade those beads and a string of "jumbo beads" to C & D, who would not only flash, but would also make out. Is B liable for causing A to miss out on a lesbianic kiss? Here, the answer turns on whether B had "reason to know" that those marijuana beads would have led to some hot girl-on-girl action. UCC § 2-715(2). Although we would like to say "yes," we do not believe this to be the case. Unless specific circumstances dictate otherwise, it is likely that all B "had reason to know" was that A could have used those beads to induce more nudity. That A found a pair of girls to make out is purely fortuitous...
