Court of Appeals Releases Opinion in Chuck Norris Case

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRTEENTH CIRCUIT
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Chuck NORRIS,
Petitioner,

v.

Bill BRASKY,
Respondent
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Before INTOXICATED, J.

I. Background

The parties in this case are well known to the court. Chuck Norris, a master of all forms of killing that have ever existed, constantly renews the sun’s power with every blink. The defendant, Bill Brasky, is a man who once turned down the Papacy because he did not like the idea of playing second-fiddle to God.

The matter before this court arises out of a petition for a writ of domination in the district court below. In his petition, Norris alleges that “[he is] the Lord Chuck Norris, who led [Brasky] out of Egypt,” and seeks injunctive relief compelling Brasky to bow before him.

In response to this petition, Brasky, appearing specially, moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, based on the fact that the law does not apply to him. The district court denied this motion after Norris performed a roundhouse kick at the hearing, sending a young law clerk’s head flying at five times the speed of light.

After the district court assumed jurisdiction over the case (and replaced the decapitated clerk), Brasky answered the petition, asserting several affirmative defenses. First, Brasky claims, his defecation smells like a grassy meadow in the springtime, and that several major fragrance companies are vying for the rights to his stool. Second, that he was the one responsible for letting the dogs out. Third, that he orchestrated the bloodiest revolt in children’s television history, leading the Doozers to violently overthrow their cruel Fraggle masters,¹ and that he still uses Gobo’s head as a makeshift athletic support.

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¹ These events were depicted in an unaired episode of
Fraggle Rock entitled “Sic Semper Tyrranis.”
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The district court reviewed Brasky’s accomplishments and found them to be most remarkable. After finding that the evidence was insufficient to declare that Norris’s testicles were substantially larger as a matter of law, the court toasted to the respondent and denied Norris’s petition. Norris appealed this denial, and, in a show of magnanimity, gouged out and ate only one of the judge’s eyes. Shortly thereafter, Brasky filed a cross-appeal on the question of jurisdiction. The issues presently before this court are as follows:

(1) Whether 69 U.S.C. § 481, which generally prevents any court from taking personal jurisdiction over Brasky, applies to a petition filed by Chuck Norris?

(2) Whether, as a matter of law, Chuck Norris has substantially bigger balls than Bill Brasky?

For the reasons stated below, we reverse the decision of the district court, grant Norris the relief sought, and offer our children as burnt offerings unto Him.

Discussion

A. The Brasky Act

Jurisdiction is the threshold question in any case. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 502-03 (1903). This is because without jurisdiction we are powerless to hear the action in the first place, and so we cannot render judgment for either party. Id. If a reviewing court finds that the lower court was without jurisdiction, we must direct it to vacate its judgment and dismiss the action. Id.

We are aware that Congress, in its infinite wisdom, has granted Bill Brasky a general exemption from the laws of this nation, commonly known as the “Brasky Act.” 69 U.S.C. § 481, et seq. (Brasky authorized to “do whatever the fuck he feels like”). This has been interpreted to preclude courts from exercising personal jurisdiction over Brasky if he does not wish to defend the action. E.g., I.P. Freeley, Inc. v. Brasky, 297 F. Supp. 3d 892 (E. D. Ak. 2001). Based on the plain language of § 481 and its subsequent interpretations, this would appear to conclusively dispose of the matter. However, Norris argues that this general exemption should be interpreted in light of the of the Brasky Act’s legislative history. Specifically, Norris argues that Congress did not intend § 481 to apply to excuse Brasky from responding to actions filed by his betters.

While we will not use extrinsic aids such as legislative history to override the plain language of a statute, we may use it to inform our interpretation of ambiguous statutory language. See U.S. v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2nd Cir. 2003). A statute is ambiguous if it can reasonably bear two different interpretations. See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004). The courts have consistently held that anything Chuck Norris does is reasonable. See, e.g., In re Anonymous Ninja Henchmen, 238 S.W.3d 83 (Tex. 1993) (Norris incapable of using “excessive” force in performing his duties as Texas Ranger). This implies that any interpretation Norris advances must also be reasonable. Hence, we are faced with the task of ascertaining whether Congress’s choice of the words “whatever the fuck” include avoiding a petition by a fellow ubermensch. We conclude that it does not.

The floor debates surrounding the passage of the Brasky Act make for relatively lively reading. Most of the remarks immediately preceding the unanimous vote involve relaying feats Brasky had performed in ages past. For example, Senator Specter stated that he had once seen Brasky perform Don Giovanni at the Sydney Opera House, and was so moved that he could not stop crying for six-and-a-half years. 115 Cong. Rec. at 60287. Similarly, Senator Clinton claimed that she would “gladly be willing to kill a man” for the opportunity to “give [Brasky] a blumpy.”² Id. at 60311. Finally, and perhaps most telling, Senator John McCain offered to pay Brasky ten million dollars if he would do him the honor of impregnating his wife, so that he could raise the fruit of Brasky’s loins. Id. at 61499-01.

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² We take judicial notice that this is both sick and wrong.
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Despite all of this hullaballoo, any mention of Chuck Norris is conspicuously absent from these debates. Had Congress intended to authorize Brasky to engage in such activities as weighty as speaking to Norris before spoken to, surely the subject would have come up. Further, it would be absurd to attribute to Congress an intent to allow Brasky to fornicate with Norris’s virgin daughter with impunity using language as broad as “whatever the fuck he feels like.” Rather, this debate shows that Congress intended to afford Brasky something akin to sovereign status, but only with respect to lesser mortals.

We therefore hold that 69 U.S.C. § 481, known as the “Brasky Act” does not permit Bill Brasky to escape jurisdiction on an action initiated by Chuck Norris, and affirm the lower court’s ruling regarding personal jurisdiction. We must now turn to the merits of the petition, and determine whether Norris was, in fact, entitled to a writ of domination.

B. Writ of Domination

At common law, a party could seek a writ of domination to have judicially determined “whether [he] has the biggest goddamn balls in the courtroom.” Wallace v. Longshanks, 103 Scot. Rep. 208 (1314) (“[T]hey may take our lives, but they’ll never take our FREEDOM”). Because of the writ’s extraordinary nature, we only issue a writ of domination upon substantial and incontrovertible evidence that the party seeking the writ is “so much more of a man” that he makes his adversary “seem like a little girl wetting herself in comparison.” Bauer v. Wayne, 91 Gthm. App. 281, 296 (2005). In Bauer, for example, the petitioner, an agent for the Counter-Terrorist Unit (CTU) sought the writ as against a purely local vigilante with a penchant for the theatrical. The Gotham Court of Appeals declined to issue a writ of domination, reasoning that:

Even though it is clear that, by thwarting the imminent detonation of a nuclear weapon on United States soil, Bauer has saved more total lives than Wayne, we cannot say that he has larger testicles as a matter of law. For example, whereas Bauer is known simply by his birth name, Wayne (in addition to his trade name) is commonly referred to as “the Dark Knight,” an intimidating appellation that strikes fear into the hearts of his enemies. Further, it is at least arguable whether standard terrorists, even those of the caliber faced by Bauer at the CTU, pose a substantially more difficult threat to overcome than a supervillain. Finally, although it is certainly impressive that Bauer accomplishes so much with only standard weapons, we cannot discount the sheer “coolness,” in a legal sense, of the many devices employed by Wayne in his crime-fighting pursuits.

Id. at 299-301.

In light of this, we must examine the relative merits of the parties’ claims to badassmotherfuckerhood. We begin by noting that the respondent’s accomplishments are quite impressive. However, we are unable to accept that they are, as a matter of law, sufficient defenses to Norris’s petition. First, it was foretold by hieroglyphics written on the bronze tablets sitting astride the doors of time and space that Chuck Norris shall appear in every generation, born of a technical virgin and sired by a lightning bolt. It is his destiny alone to subdue his enemies with fists and feet made of pure energy, and nunchucks crafted from the very bones of the world. The god of fire, Hephaestus himself, forged a magnificent suit of titanium armor for Norris, decorated with scenes from Walker, Texas Ranger; Norris, however, disintegrated it with a single thunderous fart that toppled mountain ranges hundreds of miles away, simply because he knew his skin was stronger than any metal.

To gaze upon Chuck Norris for even a single moment is to know the answer to the eternal question “why?” He is the One and the Many, the Beginning and the End, the Cock and the Balls. Chuck Norris keeps the planets in their orbits by yelling at them. Instead of urinals, Norris pisses into black holes that he creates by punching through the fabric of the space-time continuum. Every morning, he sits at his breakfast table and pours whiskey into a bowl full of raw meat, scrap metal, and the cure for cancer; he calls it “cereal.” Norris has already slept with every attractive woman who has ever lived and ever will live. Twice.

While it may be true that Bill Brasky ended the Cold War by training an entire flock of bald eagles to set off fireworks that spelled out “U.S.A.” over the Kremlin, we find that this simply cannot compare to Chuck Norris’s single-handed victory in the First Punic War - Norris traveled back in time with a bazooka, but decided at the last minute to take on the entire Carthaginian army with nothing but a donut he made out of Play-Doh. Indeed, Norris grew this very courthouse by planting a strand of hair plucked from his majestic beard. We are satisfied by substantial and incontrovertible evidence that Norris “so much more of a man” that he makes Brasky “seem like a little girl wetting herself in comparison.”

The decision of the district court is fucking REVERSED, and a writ of domination shall be issued. Bill Brasky is hereby commanded to bow before Chuck Norris, the One True God.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

New Hearsay Exception: Thorough Intoxication

Rule 803. Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:

(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.

(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.

(3) Thorough Intoxication. A statement made while the declarant was under the influence of an intoxicating beverage, and the statement was the result of consuming that beverage.

(3)(4) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.
...
2005 Committee Notes

The exception embodied in the new 803(3) reflects the ancient Roman legal maxim, "in vino veritas," or "there is truth in wine." However, it is not necessary that the declarant be under the influence of wine; rather, nearly any intoxicating beverage will suffice, including but not limited to beer, whiskey, rum, gin, tequila, malt beverages, and orange juice fermented under a radiator. (Note: the Committee has never tried the latter. And if it did, it certainly would not have gone skinny-dipping at the Washington Memorial. Anyone who tells you otherwise is a fucking liar.)

What is essential to the admissibility of a statement made under thorough intoxication is that the declarant actually be under the influence of an intoxicating beverage while the statement was made. The term "under the influence" denotes something more than a mere "buzz," however it does not require that the declarant be subject to the "blackout monkey." Similar to the "excited utterance" exception, the reliability of this exception requires the declarant to be so drunk as to be beyond the point of self-censorship when making the statement.

Express Actual Authority to Make an Offer a Third-Party Can't Refuse

1. Tom Hagen meets with Woltz, a movie producer. Tom states to Woltz that he works for a friend of Johnny Fontaine’s who would give his undying friendship to Woltz if he casts Fontaine in his upcoming film. Because Woltz has notice that Tom is acting for a principal, but has no notice of the principal’s identity, Don Corleone is an partially disclosed principal. REST. (2d) AGENCY § 4. Had Woltz accepted the Don’s offer of undying friendship, and the Don failed to perform, Tom might be personally liable for the breach. REST. (2d) AGENCY § 321.

Woltz investigates the identity of the principal and discovers that it is Don Corleone. The Don is now a fully disclosed principal and Tom drops out of any contract to take place. REST. (2d) AGENCY §§ 4, 320. However, Woltz refuses the Don’s offer. As a result, Tom, acting within the scope of his authority as consigliere, has Woltz’s prize horse decapitated and placed in Woltz’s bed. Tom is not relieved of liability in tort simply because he acts as an agent on behalf of the Don. REST. (2d) AGENCY § 343. However, law-in-action suggests that Woltz will not sue either Tom or the Don because he would likely end up dead.

2. Sollozzo (“the Turk”) meets with Don Corleone to solicit his investment in a narcotics-distribution venture. The Don refuses, but is concerned with the Turk’s involvement with the Tattaglia Family. To this end, the Don sends Luca Brasi to investigate the Turk’s connections with the Tattaglia Family. He instructs Brasi to represent to agents of the Tattaglias that he is dissatisfied with his current employment and might be interested in making a change. Because he is acting within the scope of his express actual authority, any representations to this effect would not violate his duty of loyalty to the Don. REST. (2d) AGENCY § 385, 394 (duty not to act for persons with conflicting interests variable by agreement). The Tattaglia Family does not believe Brasi, instead electing the equitable remedy of sending him to sleep with the fishes.

However, were the Tattaglia Family to rely on this representation and hire Brasi as an enforcer, an agency relationship would have been created between Brasi and the Tattaglia Family. While Brasi could argue that there was no actual consent to act on behalf of the Tattaglia Family, his actions would probably be a “manifestation of consent” upon which the Tattaglia Family could reasonably rely. REST. (2d) AGENCY § 1. As a result, Brasi would be breaching his fiduciary duties to the Tattaglia Family. REST. (2d) AGENCY §§ 394 (duty not to act during period of agency for persons whose interests conflict with the principal), 395 (duty not to disclose confidential information acquired during course of agency relationship). As a result, the Don would be liable to the Tattaglia family for Brasi's actions as the Don's agent. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 1999). Hence, the Tattaglias' self-help remedy of attempting to whack the Don would be reasonable, albeit a strategic blunder in the long run.

U.C.C. § 9-109 would be better if it said: "This Article applies to a bunch of shit, but not to certain other shit."

Amazingly, I've actually been productive today. I've actually spent the past six hours...(gasp)...outlining. Of course, this was possibly probably assuredly caused by the fact that the internet connection at Starbucks sucked more dick than a porn star working overtime. However, since Starbucks is now closed, and I've relocated to the library, my productivity had to come to an end. So now I'd like to share some of what I've learned about Secured Transactions this evening:

1) Despite it's name, "Secured Transactions" has nothing whatsoever to do with hiring a hooker to tie you to the bed. Apparently, it has to do with collateral, or some shit like that.

2) If you take a security interest in someone's firstborn, you should probably get your interest noted on the birth-certificate.

3) "Accounts" under § 9-102(a)(2) are basically the equivalent of a pimp saying "Bitch, where's my money?!?!"

4) If one pimp sells all of the ho's in his stable to another pimp, along with their accounts recievable, cf. U.S. v. Pipkins, 378 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2004) (detailed description of pimping financial affairs), this transaction would be excluded from the scope of Article 9. § 9-109(d)(4).

5) The word "fuck," or any of it's conjugations, is conspicuously absent from, not merely Article 9, but the entire UCC.

6) The following fact pattern will never appear on an exam:

Debtor is a corporation organized under Delaware law. Debtor does business in a Middle Eastern country where selling young women as “harem commodities” is legal. Creditor takes a security interest in "all of Debtors inventory, now held or after-acquired" and properly files a financing statement in Delaware. Does the Thirteenth Amendment void Creditor's interest in any harem-girls owned by Debtor, or does that country's law govern the effect of perfection under § 9-301(2)?

7) I am very ready for this semester to be over.

Fuck it, back to work.

The Tort of Cockblocking

§ 1.1 - Overview and General Definitions

(a) Cockblocking is defined in the common law as an unlawful interference by the cockblocker with the cockblockee's chances of getting play from the target. The target must be a specific person; merely throwing off the cockblockee's game is insufficient. To analogize from Justice Cardozo, proof of cockblocking in the air, so to speak, will not do. See Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 816 (N.Y. 1920).

(b) The cockblocker is the person who engages in cockblocking, that is, the actual tortfeasor.

(c) The cockblockee is the person who was cockblocked. Only the cockblockee has standing to sue on a claim of cockblocking, although the law of agency may apply under appropriate circumstances.

(d) The target is the person from whom play was sought by the cockblockee.

(e) For the purposes of this treatise, the cockblockee will be assumed to be male and the target female; the cockblockee will be assumed to be male or female, depending on the type of cockblocking at issue. However, any actor may be male or female.


§ 1.2 - Play

It is not necessary that the plaintiff would have actually engaged in intercourse with the target; rather, there must only have been a substantial likelihood that the cockblockee would have hooked up. While to be actionable, cockblocking requires something more than a mere kiss, what counts as "play" shall be determined with reference to the local community in which the encounter took place. For example, evidence that the cockblockee would have engaged in a "hot make-out session" may be all that is required (for example, at a high school party), while other times the cockblockee must prove that "dude, she would have totally gone down on me" in others, see, e.g., College.

Note how characterization of the facts underlying "play" alter the claim. For example:

A meets B at a bar and they hit it off. They soon begin making out heavily. C, jealous of her friend, demands that B go home with her. C could potentially argue that she did not "prevent" A from getting play from B because they had already been playing serious tonsil-hockey at the bar. However, A could argue that he would have gotten to third base, had C not interfered and B come home with him. At this point, the court would have to consider questions of proximate cause in deciding on how it ought to characterize the alleged prevented "play."

§ 1.3 - Chances of Getting Play from the Target

The cockblockee's chances of actually getting play from the target is always a question for the trier of fact. Proof may be had by direct or circumstantial evidence. Notwithstanding any statutes or rules of evidence to the contrary, the target's sexual history is almost always relevant to determining the cockblockee's chances; such history may include, but is not limited to the target's preferred "type," the target's "easiness" (including when alcohol is involved), and any prior play from target recieved by the cockblockee.

§ 2.1 - Types of Cockblocking

The law recognizes three types of cockblocking: negligent cockblocking, intentional cockblocking, and malicious cockblocking.

§ 2.2 - Negligent Cockblocking

The cockblocker negligently cockblocks the cockblockee if his conduct poses an unreasonable risk of interfering with the cockblockee's chances of getting play from the target, and that he should have been aware of such risk.

§ 2.21 - Unreasonable Interference

The cockblocker's conduct must pose an unreasonable risk of interfering with the cockblockee's chances of hooking up with the target. What consitutes an unreasonable risk will be weighed relative to the cockblockee's actual chances of getting play from the target. The cockblockee's chances must therefore be measured at the time of the incident. For example, if at the time of the incident, A, the target, is totally wasted and would not have hooked up with B sober, B's chances with A must be measured relative to "drunk A," not "sober A." That A would have chewed his or her arm off upon waking up next to B is not relevant to B's chances. However, that B was "coyote ugly" is relevant to whether the interference was reasonable.

§ 2.22 - Cockblocker's Awareness of the Risk

To be actionable, the cockblocker should have been aware of that risk. Negligent cockblocking does not require a mental state, hence it is not necessary that the cockblocker was actually aware of the risk. Hence, that the cockblocker was too drunk to recognize that B was grinding her ass on A is no defense. Indeed, the degree and obviousness of flirtation between A and B is highly relevant to whether the cockblocker "should have been aware" of the risk his or her conduct posed to B getting play.

§ 2.23 - Conduct of the Cockblocker

Finally, there must have been actual conduct that interfered with the cockblockee's chances of getting play from the target. Acts of ommision are not negligent cockblocking. For example, if B was hitting on A, and C was busy downing shots at the bar, B cannot sue C for failing to be a good wingman and "take one for the team."

§ 2.3 - Intentional Cockblocking

A person commits the tort of intentional cockblocking if, with the intent to prevent the cockblockee from getting play from the target, engages in conduct that prevents the cockblockee from getting play.

§ 2.31 - Intent

The tort of cockblocking incorporates the common law on intent from other intentional torts. As such, a cockblocker may intend to cockblock by having a subjective "purpose in the heart" to cockblock, or may "know with reasonable certainty" that cockblocking will flow from her conduct. Here, severe intoxication may negate intent, if the plaintiff's theory is "knowledge with reasonable certainty." It does not however, negate a subjective "purpose in the heart." Hence, it may be advisable for the plaintiff to plead both negligent and intentional cockblocking, if the cockblocker appeared to be intoxicated.

Further, like other intentional torts, the doctrine of "transferred intent" is applicable to cockblocking. For example:

A, B, and C are approached by D and E. D hits on A while E hits on B. C approves of D, but not E and attempts to ruin E's chances with B. Although E is successful in separating B from the group, A is annoyed by the whole situation and leaves with C. C's intent to cockblock E transfers to E in the same way that missing a punch and hitting an innocent bystander transfers that tortfeasor's unlawful intent.

§ 2.32 - Conduct

Like negligent cockblocking, intentional cockblocking requires actual conduct, rather than acts of ommission. See § 2.23, supra.

§ 2.34 - Affirmative Defenses

(a) Consent of Cockblockee. While this is a rare situation, a person prone to beer goggles may ask his friends to prevent him from hooking up with an unattractive target, or to prevent him from cheating on his girlfriend. Here, the two issues for the trier of fact will be (1) whether the cockblockee actually consented, and (2) whether the conduct within the scope of the consent (i.e., were the cockblocker's standards too high). In cases where the target was questionably the scope of the consent, the trier of fact should consider both the objective attractiveness of the target, the clarity with which the consent was given. Of course, the cockblockee is always free to change his mind, regardless of the amount of alcohol consumed.

(b) Consent of Target. Similar considerations apply as with consent of the cockblockee. However, the trier of fact should be particularly careful to distinguish between cases where the consent to interfere was in force at the time of the conduct, and those where target changed her mind and the cockblocker used the target's prior "consent" as a pretext for her own agenda.

(c) True Competitor. A competitor is a person who cockblocks with the intent of getting play from the target himself. This defense follows from the maxim that "all's fair in love and war." However, in order to be a "true" competitor, the trier of fact must find that he had an equal or greater chance of recieving play from the target than the cockblockee.

§ 2.4 - Malicious Cockblocking

Malicious cockblocking incorporates all of the elements of intentional cockblocking. However, it contains the additional element that the cockblocker "willfully and wontonly" interfered with the cockblockee's chances of getting play. In other words, malicious cockblocking can be thought of as "depraved mind cockblocking," (similar to the mental element in many second-degree murder statutes). Typically, though not necessarily, the malicious cockblocker will be female, who will not be getting any action that night, and so feels compelled to drag her friends into her misery.

Whether intentional cockblocking qualifies as "malicious" is a matter of culpability. Therefore, it will always be a question for the trier of fact.

Malicious cockblocking carries punitive damages.

Contract Law at the Speed of Light

One of the reasons that I think I’ve done as well as I have in law school is because of my fascination with outlandish hypotheticals. In particular, I love the mental exercise of trying to come up with a fact-pattern to thwart any given rule of law. While these scenarios are often absurd and totally unlikely to come up in the practice of law – or “real life,” for that matter – fucking around with them seems to help me explore the contours of the law, finding the nuances and loopholes, the joints and bendy parts.

Sometimes, however, these just get totally ridiculous. For example, during my first-year contracts classes, I pondered how Einstein’s theory of relativity would affect the statute of frauds. Granted, I am by no means an expert in theoretical physics – hell, I can barely do long division – but I have a layman’s interest in this stuff. Basically, time is reference-frame dependent; as you approach the speed of light, time itself slows down. Since the statute of frauds requires you to have a written contract where performance takes a year or more, this got me wondering: whose reference frame governs a contract?

Let’s say that A hires B to work for him, but doesn’t reduce the agreement to writing. B takes his family on a month-long vacation to a planet a third of a light-year away, traveling at 0.9 times the speed of light. While he’s away, A decides to fire B – can B successfully sue A for lost wages, or will A be able to use the statute of frauds to bar B?

The question depends on whether the courts measure the time for performance using A’s reference frame, or B’s. At that speed, only nine months has passed for B. However, over a year and eight months has passed back on earth, where A’s been twiddling his thumbs. So who wins?

Surprisingly, despite my significant research into the subject-area (read: fucking around on Westlaw), there’s no answer. No court (for obvious reasons) has yet addressed anything even remotely resembling the burning issue of relativistic-speed travel. Also, calculating the time for performance using the Lorenz Transformations would be really fucking complicated.

Fuck it.

Legal Terms for Everyday Use: The "12(b)(6)"

12(b)(6) - A situation where no matter what you do, you're not getting laid - usually time to abandon ship.

Example:
"Yeah, that girl's a total 12(b)(6). She's not leaving her friends tonight."

Source: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6):

Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: ...
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted...

Basically, it's a motion that says "even if everything you said in your complaint is true, you're fucked because there's nothing the law can do for you." In other words, you're still not getting any action, no matter how good your game.

“Don't pee on my leg and tell me it's raining.”

Ah, daytime television, you train wreck, you. So horrible, and yet I cannot look away. And, as it seems, I cannot stop thinking like a lawyer – it’s a fucking involuntary reflex.

Anyway, the case on Judge Mathis was pretty fucking simple. The plaintiff, a 300 lb. girl, hired a fashion designer to create a prom dress for her. The dress wasn’t ready on time, and she didn’t go to her senior prom. Since she didn’t pay for the dress, she sued the fashion designer for the trauma of missing her senior prom. And, of course, all I could think was, “Ok, this is just a question of consequential damages, and it’s a loser.”

Under Article 2, you can get “consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach” for “any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise.” U.C.C. § 2-715. In other words, all the bitch had to do was buy another fucking dress and she could have easily gone to her prom, shared an intoxicated romp in the back of her boyfriend’s parents’ station wagon, and she would have been able to go to the abortion clinic three months later and live happily ever after. And of course, she could have sued for the extra cash she had to spend to get a prom dress on such short notice.* But no, she decided to mitigate her damages by sitting in her bathroom and crying while she freebased a gallon of Rocky Road. This is summary judgment shit, maybe even 12(b)(6)-able (depending on the pleadings). Why the fuck would you let this case get to trial?

Because it’s good TV and your producers choose the cases, that’s why. And, of course, because you’re not actually a “judge” presiding over a “court” – your “jurisdiction” is based on a contract between the parties and the network. And the bored housewives watching your show while they spoon-feed Gerber peas to their precious little poop-factories are going to flip the fucking channel if you start talking about the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854) or citing the Official Commentary to the U.C.C.. Besides, under the Federal Arbitration Act, you’re about as likely to get reversed on appeal as I am to start working at a soup kitchen. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (really fucking limited grounds for vacating arbitration award).

Fuck it.

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* - Whether she could have gotten compensated for having to orally pleasure the manager at Dress Barn is an open question.

Some Tax Hypotheticals I Did Not Bring Up in Class

1) Employer maintains a buisness for the distribution of marijuana. He offers his employees the opportunity to smoke a bowl with him whenever they're in the neighborhood. May the lower-level dealers exclude the fair market value of the marijuana they consume from gross income?

The free marijuana is likely excludable as a "de minimis fringe" under I.R.C. § 132(a)(4). An employee benefit is a "de minimis fringe" if, "after taking into account the frequency with which similar fringes are provided by the employer to the employer's employees," the value of that benefit is "so small as to make accounting for it unreasonable or administratively impracticable." I.R.C. § 132(e)(1).

Generally, the frequency will be determined by reference to how often Employer smokes out each individual employee. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(b)(1). However, "where it would be administratively difficult to determine frequency with respect to individual employees," frequency will be determined with regard to how often the employer smokes out his workforce as a whole. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(b)(2). Assuming that Employer is high as a motherfucking kite while he provides the fringe benefits, it would be administratively impracticable for him to remember what he did five minutes ago, much less which individual employee he has provided fringes, how many hits they each took, or how often. Of course, the same thing could be said about how often he smokes out his employees as a whole.

Further, the value of the marijuana is "so small as to make accounting for it unreasonable or administratively impractible." I.R.C. § 132(e)(1). Assuming that the average employee smokes between one and three bowls worth of marijuana (or two hits of "really good shit") while watching reruns of Aqua Teen Hunger Force², he is unlikely to have consumed more than the fair market value of a few cups of coffee and a donught. See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1).


2) Employer operates a brothel and a casino-hotel in the state of Nevada. He offers all his employees free time with any unoccupied hooker. What, if any, tax consequences do his employees face, should they choose to cash in on this fringe benefit?

This arrangement could arguably be either a "no-additional-cost service" or a "qualified employee discount." I.R.C. §§ 132(a)(1), 132(a)(2). First, however, we must separate out the employees that work only for the hotel. Both of these exclusions require the employees to be providing their services to Employer in "the ordinary course of [his brothel's] line of business." I.R.C. §§ 132(b)(1), 132(c)(4). For example, the brothel's bra-sorter is in the running, while the casino's blackjack dealer is out of luck.

Whether this benefit is a "no-additional-cost service" for brothel employees really depends on whether a whorehouse counts as an "excess capacity service." Treas. Reg. § 1.132-2(a)(2). If this is to be the case, we must assume that an unoccupied prostitute is analogous to an empty seat on a plane that an airline may travel in for free. See id. Arguably, this is the case since if the prostitute is just sitting there with her thumb up her ass³ instead of entertaining a customer, she's not generating any additional revenue for Employer's business. Further, the service provided can be minimal in terms of additional labor provided - the prostitute can simply lay there. However, § 1.132-2(a)(5)(ii) seems to suggest otherwise. Although the employer can arguably characterize the fringe benefit such that he is simply giving his employees access to otherwise unoccupied bedrooms, and that the hookers are providing an incidental service akin to that provided by airline stewardesses, it is more far more likely that the IRS would characterize fellatio, rather than use of the room as the primary service Employer provides.

However, even if the free whores are not a "no-additional-cost service," it may be a "qualified employee discount." Treas. Reg. § 1.132-2(a)(2). Under this categorization, the employees can exclude 20% of the cost of what Employer charges customers for the services that the prostitutes provide. I.R.C. § 132(c)(1)(B). This amount, of course, may vary from hooker to hooker, and therefore some employees may wish to avail themselves of a less-expensive whore in order to avoid the remaining 80% of their debauchery from being taxed at a higher rate.

What the fuck is wrong with me? Fuck it.

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¹ - Although I know why I've been on your mom. Hoo-ha!

² - Meatwad make the money, see. Meatwad get the honeys, G.

³ - Or, up a colleague's ass. Whatever.

I see dead people... explicitly acknowledging their wills

Ok, here's an agument that will probably get laughed out of court:

In Wisconsin, one of the conditions that must be met for a will to be validly executed is that the will "must be signed by two or more witnesses, each of whom signed within a reasonable time after witnessing any of the following:
(a) The signing of the will...
(b) The testator's implicit or explicit acknowledgement of the testator's signature on the will, within the conscious presence of each of the witnesses.
(c) The testator's implicit or explicit acknowledgement of tht will, within the conscious presence of each of the witnesses." Wis. Stats. § 853.03.

However, § 851.035 defines "conscious presence" as "within the range of any of a person's senses" (emphasis added). So what happens if you (1) acknowledge your will in front of one witness, who then signs it, (2) die, (3) come back as a ghost, (4) find someone with a well-developed sixth sense, and explicitly acknowledge your will in front of them, and (5) they sign your will before anyone claims shit under intestacy? Do you just get screwed?

Probably, because the law treats the undead like second-class citizens. It's wrong, and something needs to be done about it. I mean, let's say you get bitten by a vampire - does that mean your shit automatically gets probated? Or, can you name yourself the beneficiary for your own life insurance policy if you anticipate becoming a zombie?

Hell, the law doesn't even acknowledge that the undead are people too, decomposing though they may be. If you prick them, do they not bleed? Well, probably not. Simply because they shuffle along and eat brains, or are invisible, and tend to prey on the living, doesn't mean that they don't have feelings too.

Serously, how do I get off on these tangents? Fuck it.

"Show Me Your Tits!": A Contract Law Analysis

Professor Seymore Butz, J. Walker School of Law
Professor Oliver Cleauzoff, Ron Jeremy University Law School
69 J. L. & Alc. 1234 (Mardi Gras Symposium Issue)

... It is therefore clear that this transaction is a unilateral contract. We have an offer (e.g. "Show me your tits, woooooo!!!") supported by consideration (beads), and an acceptance that is manifested by performance (that is, baring of the breasts). The question, of course, is whether this transaction falls within the scope of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. We believe that it does.

Article 2 applies to transactions in goods, with "goods" defined as "all things...which are movable at the time of identification to the contract other than the money in which the price is to be paid...." UCC §§ 2-102, 2-105. Clearly, plastic beads are movable at the time of the contract, but what of boobs? Other than those surgically enhanced yabos, the average bosom will heave up and down, left and right, jiggling and bouncing - oh so delightfully movable. However, regardless of whether sweet sweater-kittens fall within the Article 2 definition of "goods," as flashing is the valuable consideration in exchange for particular beads, they are part and parcel of an Article 2 transaction.

...

Consider the following scenario: A offers a string of expensive "marijuana-leaf" beads to B in exchange for a flash. B accepts and places the beads around her neck, but refuses to perform. What remedies might A pursue?

A has several options. First, he could seek restitution of his beads. This, however, would not be ideal. Although uncommon enough to warrant certain the sight of mammaries, even marijuana-leaf beads fluctuate in value according to time and place. If the lawsuit takes place after Mardi Gras (alternatively, Spring Break), it is highly unlikely that A will be able to exchange his beads for a glimpse of milk globes. Hence, although he will be put back where he was before he had entered into the contract, even the judge cannot order restitution of time. A will have to wait until the next Mardi Gras before his beads regain their value.

However, the same reasons that make restitution unattractive also make specific performance a real possibility. Specific performance is a viable remedy "where the goods are unique or in other proper circumstances." UCC § 2-716(1). This is a case of "other proper circumstances" because, given the gap between breach and suit, A will be unable to "cover" by convincing another drunk girl to drop her shirt for those beads, and may have no other beads special enough to see a quality pair of tatas. Hence, specific performance is the proper alternative, and B must display her melons in all their glory.

One final issue arises, insofar as whether B may be liable for consequential damages. For example, let us say that A can prove that, had B simply rejected his offer, A would have been able to trade those beads and a string of "jumbo beads" to C & D, who would not only flash, but would also make out. Is B liable for causing A to miss out on a lesbianic kiss? Here, the answer turns on whether B had "reason to know" that those marijuana beads would have led to some hot girl-on-girl action. UCC § 2-715(2). Although we would like to say "yes," we do not believe this to be the case. Unless specific circumstances dictate otherwise, it is likely that all B "had reason to know" was that A could have used those beads to induce more nudity. That A found a pair of girls to make out is purely fortuitous...